Tag: aviation

AQP & Crew Resource Management

~ cjois

CRM began with presentation at NASA in 1979 (Bruce, Gao, & King, 2018). Born against the backdrop of the Tenerife disaster in 1977 and the United Airlines incident over Portland, Oregon in 1978, CRM has evolved and what we see today is known as 6th generation CRM (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). Major changes have occurred between the Cockpit Resource Management of 1979 and the Crew Resource Management models of today. The primary shifts have been around scope and inclusiveness. The Colgan Air mishap in 2014 then led to a shift from passive CRM to a far more active Threat and Error model-based CRM (Holt & Poynor, 2016).

While very complex when studied in detail, stated simply, ‘Threats’ and ‘Errors’ necessitate CRM-based actions/behaviors. Fatigue is a ‘Threat’, can cause ‘Errors’, and needs CRM-based behavior to remediate or recover from the situation. Given this simplistic formulation of the model, it is pertinent that we model the various types of threats that fatigue can pose before we can bake it into the CRM/TEM training programs. Fatigue has known to cause many incidents. American 1420 in June 1999, Colgan Air 3407 in February 2009, Corporate Airlines 5966 in October 2004 are all cases where fatigue has been called out as a leading factor (Avers & Johnson, 2011) 

Unlike skill or competency training, where measurement is somewhat easier, training for behavioral responses is not all that straightforward. For example, training for a response to deal with an engine flame out on takeoff is not the same as training someone for executing a flight control maneuver. Training on factors like fatigue is more complex. On one hand, the human mechanism will not produce behaviors of an individual in a fatigued state unless they are in a state of fatigue. On the other hand, it will be a logistical challenge to get pilot resources to be a part of a simulator scenarios when they are in actually in state of fatigue. 

However, a value-additive approach to building training around fatigue-related behaviors is to first demonstrate the outcomes that fatigue can produce through simulations and scenarios. Since it is a such a strong reality of aviation today, it is worth modeling, scheduling and planning for simulator training for individuals when they are really in a state of fatigue. As an example, scheduling an intense simulator session when the circadian rhythm is in a trough is a good start. This could be further intensified by scheduling a full day of work prior to the late evening simulator session. These could induce fatigue prior to being presented with scenarios.

Fatigue like many things can only be measured through the many symptoms of fatigue it produces. The Center for Human Sciences in Farnborough, UK has developed a model for fatigue describing the symptoms of fatigue (Belyavin & Spencer, 2004). Some of them are as follows – diminished perception, a general lack of awareness; diminished motor skills and sluggish reactions; problems with short-term memory; channeled concentration, fixation on a single possibly unimportant issue, to the neglect of others; being easily distracted by unimportant matters; poor judgement; and slow decision making.

Modeling simulator scenarios that are focused on amplifying the symptoms above will yield the best results from a training perspective. Let us choose the symptom of fatigue-induced short-term memory. Modeling a high traffic congested airspace with multiple air traffic control inputs such as altitude/heading/speed changes, approach restrictions and last-minute runway changes could provide for a scenario where effects of fatigue on short term memory can be assessed.

It is important to note that not everyone reacts the same way to fatigue. While the list of symptoms is generic, each human is different. The “Swiss Cheese (Reason) model” begins to come together when a human weakness aligns with a fatigue-induced symptom and the prevailing circumstance to cause an incident (Reason, Hollnagel, & Paries, 2006). To elaborate further, if a pilot monitoring (PM) and managing communications on the flightdeck is weaker on short-term memory capacity to begin with (when compared to say, her/his motor skills), then fatigue will impact her/his ability to read back and comply with air traffic control inputs. The fatigue threat, causes memory errors, leading to the need for CRM-based recovery. Recovery in this situation could be the pilot flying (PF) noticing it and taking remedial actions. On the other hand, if one has the propensity to be weaker at motor reflexes, then fatigue would impact their ability manually control the airplane. Other scenarios could include failure annunciations to appear late in the approach requiring a quick go-around decision. Fatigue impairs decision making and such scenarios could make for good insights.  

The challenge most times is that many/most individuals aren’t aware of their weak areas and believe that they can “pull it off”. 

The value in AQP, CRM/TEM models is that they allow for the program to be setup in a way that it exposes resources to reality of these situations and more importantly allows individuals, to some degree, understand their own limitations. No amount of Powerpoint presentations will provide the experience of being in the situation, even if it is only in a simulator.

References:

Avers, K., & Johnson, W. B. (2011). A review of Federal Aviation Administration fatigue research: Transitioning scientific results to the aviation industry. Aviation Psychology and Applied Human Factors, 1(2), 87–98. https://doi-org.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/10.1027/2192-0923/a000016

Belyavin, A. J., & Spencer, M. B. (2004). Modeling performance and alertness: the QinetiQ approach. Aviation, space, and environmental medicine, 75(3), A93-A103.

Bruce, P. J., Gao, Y., & King, J. M. C. (2018;2017;). Airline operations: A practical guide (1st ed.). London, [England];New York, New York;: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315566450

Helmreich, R. L., Merritt, A. C., & Wilhelm, J. A. (1999). The evolution of crew resource management training in commercial aviation. The international journal of aviation psychology, 9(1), 19-32.

Holt, M. J., & Poynor, P. J. (2016). Air carrier operations (Second ed.). Newcastle, Washington: Aviation Supplies & Academics, Inc.

Reason, J., Hollnagel, E., & Paries, J. (2006). Revisiting the Swiss cheese model of accidents. Journal of Clinical Engineering, 27(4), 110-115.

Aviation Human Factors and Prospective Memory

~ cjois

Prospective memory is an emerging area of research within the field of Cognitive Psychology and Human Factors. Remembering to perform intended actions can be critical, especially in safety-related occupations like Air Traffic Control.

Failures in prospective memory (PM) are the reason why we fail to perform intended or required actions. There is increasing interest in the topic of prospective memory and the reasons for failures of such memory. While this subject is still under intense debate, according to one school of thought, prospective memory recall is driven by the process of monitoring. Another view is that it occurs as part of spontaneous retrieval. In either case, the intention for the planned task is retrieved which then allows for action. Distractions are one source of why action is forgotten.

Interruptions of any kind can be a cause (Shorrock, 2005; Sternberg & Sternberg, 2016). A telephone call or request for information can be sufficient cause to not return back to the ongoing task. The variety of peripheral tasks that controllers need to perform often conflict with the primary task of maintaining separation. Such tasks could include scanning displays, accepting aircraft, gathering and relaying weather advisories and responding to pilot requests.

Prospective memory recall is predicated on cues. A cue or trigger is necessary for prospective memory to work. As described earlier, to recall the intent, the human mind constantly polls for such items. When polling is not invested in, such as when we are preoccupied with other task(s), then the intent is not recalled and action is termed as ‘forgotten’. Under another school of thought, spontaneous retrieval occurs on account of a system within our brain that causes automatic retrieval of items at the appropriate times. Once again, when tasks preoccupy, spontaneity drops and we tend to forget the intent. Proximity, recency and task regularity could all affect prospective memory (Vortac, Edwards & Manning, 1995).

In the context of ATC, prospective memory failures can prove to be catastrophic. The incident at San Francisco of a controller positioning an aircraft on the runway for takeoff, forgetting about it, and further clearing an aircraft to land on the same runway is a case in point (Loft, 2014). They can affect controller actions such as separation, scope monitoring or performing other tasks such as flight strip updates, aircraft transfer, peer collaboration and shift transitions. Inaccurate recall of information on a strip, failing to observe conflicts and failure to annotate strips correctly are all examples of PM failures. Controllers may intend correctly but then fail to follow through on that thinking because they simply “forgot to do so”. In the realm of ATC, cues are either based on time or based on events (Loft, 2014; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). However, monitoring takes a cost in the form of “brain cycles” and therefore impacts performance. Such impacts could come in the form of slowing down a certain action in order to devote time to monitoring.

External cues are an effective way to mitigate the risks of prospective memory failure (Vortac & Edwards, 1995). Memory aids are useful and can be any tool, prop or other aid that could serve as a reminder (FAA Video, 2015). They need to be incorporated into the routine though and not be ad-hoc. Mnemonics and placards are one way to avoid prospective memory errors (Loft, 2014; Stein, 1991). Using free text to jot down notes is another option. Memory aids must be effective. A good example from the video is that of holding a strip in hand as a reminder when there is a vehicle inspecting the runway. There is a growing interest in having the system alert and warn if an action is overdue. The sophistication available today makes it possible to code rules into the system and have it warn the controller. However, this may lead to the same type of over dependence on automation and sense of complacency that we find occur in pilots.

References
Federal Aviation Administration. (2015, September 02). Retrieved April 25, 2017, from https://www.faa.gov/tv/?mediaId=1151 (Links to an external site.)
Federal Aviation Administration. (2015, September 02). Retrieved April 25, 2017, from https://www.faa.gov/tv/?mediaId=1152 (Links to an external site.)
Loft, S. (2014). Applying psychological science to examine prospective memory in simulated air traffic control. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23(5), 326-331.
McDaniel, M. A.. & Einstein G. (2007). Prospective Memory. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/erau/detail.action?docID=996509
Shorrock, S. T. (2005). Errors of memory in air traffic control. Safety science, 43(8), 571-588.
Stein, E. S., & Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center (U.S.). (1991). Air traffic controller memory: A field survey. (). Springfield, Va;Atlantic City International Airport, N.J;: Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center.
Sternberg, R. J., & Sternberg, K. (2016). Cognitive psychology. Nelson Education.
Vortac, O. U., Edwards, M. B., & Manning, C. A. (1995). Functions of external cues in prospective memory. Memory, 3(2), 201-219.

Aviation Human Factors: Communication to Action

~ cjois

Words spoken or written, absolutely have a deep impact on an audience. The “It’s a Beautiful Day, and I Can’t See It” video is a testament to this reality of life. Language is a powerful tool, and even unspoken words can elicit an emotional response from others.

All action follows perception. In the video, the same message rewritten a different way had a totally different response. The fact that different words caused different response indicates that beyond triggering action, the human brain develops some form of visualization when presented with words. Such visualization triggers emotions. Emotions supplement the action. While the basic action of giving to the blind man remained the same, the quantum of giving was driven by the emotion that was generated by the newly stated signboard.

The first step in human information processing is perception. The process of receipt allows the brain to perform other actions thereafter. So if the perception is formed wrong, all other actions thereafter will also be wrong. In the context of ATC human factors, this is critical to understand. It is for this reason that pilots and controllers speak standard phraseology. Certain terms are exclusively maintained within such standard phraseology to drive certain perceptions followed thereafter by a specific set of actions. For example, an ‘emergency’ call is meant to drive certain actions.

Despite this, mis-perception (and hence incorrect, inaccurate follow through) can be caused due to many reasons. One such reason can be premeditated expectations on the part of the recipient. There are times when a listener is expecting a certain input and regardless of what the speaker says, the listener tends to “hear what she/he expected to hear”. For example, in a recent Flying magazine article, a pilot continued his approach despite the controller asking him to go-around. This is partly because the pilot had a deep set intention to complete his approach and land. In another such article, the pilot made a left 360 despite the controller asking him explicitly to make a right turn. Comfort with a left turn or a premeditated thought, or prior experience at that airport caused him to make a left turn this time. Other factors may play a role. For example, a pilot gets a clearance. It contains an intersection that’s not on the SID. A sense of intimidation can cause a pilot not to ask for clarification. This can lead to issues once in flight. In the case of Avianca 52, the simple use of the ‘emergency’ word may have saved the situation. That term sets a perception. The term “caution” in ATC is meant to drive additional care on the part of the pilot.

So as can be seen the use of (or the lack of use of) certain phrases is very important in the ATC context. On the other hand, the use of non-standard language can be equally damaging. Using non-standard terms dilutes the purpose for which they are meant for. Crisp, succinct use of language is very important in certain operational contexts. Often in un-towered airports, pilots use the CTAF frequency for general talk. One in a while that may be okay but such use dilutes the use of that frequency for more important safety calls.

Communication, perception and action are tightly connected. Words affect perception and perception affects action.

CJ

Winter Afternoon Flight

~ cjois

It’s felt great to get up in the air again after hibernating in sub-zero temperatures for over a month. It was crystal clear day. A few bumps here and there but overall a swell day to fly.

The snow had more or less cleared out after a couple above-zero days last weekend.

Traffic was heavy. Everyone wanted to fly, I guess. The Garmin 530, prompted by ADS-B technology was indicating traffic objects constantly. I wished I could have stayed up in the air for viewing the sunset.

Overflew the field at 2500ft before turning downwind for Runway 20.

Aviation and Automation

~ cjois

Automation has eased workload on the flightdeck but, in turn, has also become a source of increased cognitive load on pilots (Salas & Maurino, 2010). Coherence has emerged as a necessary competency for modern day pilots. In order to mitigate surprises, pilots need to carry mental models of underlying systems and plausible use scenarios (Sherry et al., 2001). Coherence techniques can be enabled (or impeded) by a top-down human influence known as ‘Attention’ (Gibb, Gray & Scharff, 2010). Collectively, these expectations are onerous and it is important to ask whether the human mind can truly live up to them. This question is even more important given the levels of automation complexity in modern day aircraft.

One of the highlights of this week’s readings was the aspect of ‘coherence’ (Salas & Maurino, 2010). For coherence to be effective, pilots need to have a deep understanding of the underlying logic, systems and automation impacts. The cognitive load has grown significantly over the years and continues to grow even faster today. While it is possible to acquire and display a lot more data in the form of meaningful information on extra-rich customizable displays, an important consideration would be to understand at what point this reaches practical human limits.

In the end, there is no limit on information that can be provided or should be assimilated by the crew. What matters is how much can be meaningfully assimilated in limited amounts of time (many times minutes or seconds) and most importantly, acted upon to achieve an outcome.

Information overload occurs frequently and very rapidly. My humble observation is that a few different visual and aural call-outs occurring simultaneously (example: a GPWS callout and a TCAS alert) are enough to cause overload in an otherwise quiet flightdeck. If they occur to be in conflict, its worse. With rising stress levels, saturation occurs faster (Salas & Maurino, 2010). The ability to filter, and hone in, on important elements of information being presented is the answer to avoiding overwhelm. I believe that this ability is a function of two things – a) experience and b) personality.

I was reading the September 2015 issue of the Flying Magazine on my way back from a business trip recently. Les Abend, a 777 captain, who features a regular section in the magazine has an interesting article on simulators in the September edition. In fact, he specifically calls out to the evolving role of Human Factors in aviation. He also alludes to the topic of automation diluting core flying skills. Interesting read.

References
Abend, L. (2015, 09). IT’S NOT JUST ABOUT THE SIMULATOR. Flying, 142, 84-84,86. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/docview/1704438154?accountid=27203
Dunwoody, P. T. (2009). Introduction to the special issue: Coherence and correspondence in judgment and decision making. Judgment and Decision Making, 4(2), 113. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/docview/1011289242?accountid=27203
Foster, Jessica (2015, October 21). https://erau.instructure.com/courses/23563/discussion_topics/200361
Gibb, R., Gray, R., & Scharff, L. (2010). Aviation Visual Perception : Research Misperception and Mishaps. Farnham, Surrey, GBR: Ashgate Publishing Group. Retrieved from http://www.ebrary.com (Links to an external site.)
Ledesma, Julio. (2015, October 19). Message posted to https://erau.instructure.com/courses/23563/discussion_topics/200361
Mosier, K., Sethi, N., McCauley, S., Khoo, L., Richards, J., Lyall, E.. . Hecht, S. (2003). Factors impacting coherence in the automated cockpit. Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting Proceedings, 47(1), 31-31.
Salas, E., Jentsch, F., & Maurino, D. (Eds.). (2010). Human factors in aviation. Academic Press.
Sherry, L., Feary, M., Polson, P., & Palmer, E. (2001). What’s it doing now? Taking the covers off autopilot behavior. In Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology (pp. 1-6).

FAA’s NextGen Program

~ cjois

FAA’s NextGen is a program with a lot of promise. But like every large transformation program, success results out of flawless execution of the plan. Vision is important and it plays an important role. However, history is rife with many examples of great vision and flawed execution. 

FAA’s NextGen definitely has its critics, many of them are in Congress itself. The scale, size and complexity of program leads to high cost. On the other hand, the very same traits make the program hard to qualify and quantify. The measures are hard to define and the metrics are hard even more difficult to communicate. The FAA’s site is increasingly driven to show videos, animations and other material that can tell the taxpayer and/or flyer the implications and benefits of NextGen. The benefits are beginning to accrue (United joins NextGen Data Communications”, 2013). Clearly, current day criticisms are indicative that they are not doing enough to convince the stakeholders (Ashley, 2015; Pianin, 2014). The NextGen program would have been better off being handled as specific initiatives focused on specific benefits. Bundling too much into one program leads to the issues that NextGen is facing. 

The move from traditional Radar-based to air traffic management to GPS-reliance is inevitable. However, the implications for pilots, airlines, flyers, and taxpayers are not small. Prior studies of the USNAS and air traffic related issues in the US have adequately indicated the need for transformation (FAA, 2004; 2007; 2011). In my mind, this transformation is not an option. The criticism that its waste of money is not true. It is much needed and eventually the US will benefit from such a transformation. As to whether the FAA should do a better task of earning value on money spent and fast tracking the program to success is another question. The FAA can, and should, absolutely doing a better job of keeping the program on track and communicating the benefits to relevant stakeholders. 

References – 

Denver International Airport starts new arrival-departures for NextGen. (2013, May 28). Retrieved March 28, 2015 from http://www.denverpost.com/ci_23333350/denver-international-airport-starts-new-arrival-departures-nextgenLinks to an external site.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2004). Capacity Needs in the National Airspace System: An Analysis of Airports and Metropolitan Area Demand and Operational Capacity in the Future. Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/airports/resources/publications/reports/media/NAS_needs.pdfLinks to an external site.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2007). Capacity Needs in the National Airspace System: An Analysis of Airports and Metropolitan Area Demand and Operational Capacity in 2015 and 2025. Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/airports/resources/publications/reports/media/fact_2.pdfLinks to an external site.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2011). National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems Report. Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/airports/planning_capacity/npias/reports/Links to an external site.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2014). NextGen Implementation Plan 2014. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/library/media/NextGen_Implementation_Plan_2014.pdfLinks to an external site.

Harris: United airlines joins FAA NextGen data communications avionics equipage program. (2013). Travel & Leisure Close – Up, Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/docview/1444529303?accountid=27203Links to an external site.

Halsey, A. (2015, May 1). Scathing report: FAA isn’t delivering what was promised in $40 billion project. Retrieved December 18, 2015, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/report-says-faa-isnt-delivering-what-was-promised-in-40-billion-project/2015/05/01/81676e6a-eff4-11e4-a55f-38924fca94f9_story.html

Long-Term Market. (n.d.). Retrieved March 21, 2015, from http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/cmo/index.pageLinks to an external site.?

Pianin, E. (2014, November 19). Congress Enraged by the FAA’s $40B White Elephant. Retrieved December 18, 2015, from http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2014/11/19/NextGen-Congress-Enraged-FAA-s-40B-White-ElephantLinks to an external site.

United Airlines Starts NextGen Flight Procedures in Houston. (2014, June 10). Retrieved March 28, 2015, from http://www.aviationtoday.com/av/topstories/United-Airlines-Starts-NextGen-Flight-Procedures-in-Houston_82359.html#.VRbYOikQwhF